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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WASHINGTON'S RECENT AMNDEmNTs:
UNIVERSAL MANDATORY COVERAGE, LIBERALIZED BENEFITS, AND
A CONTROVERSIAL Two-WAY PLAN-Ch. 289, Washington Laws of
1971; Ch. 43, Washington Laws of 1972.
In the closing hours of the 1971 First Extraordinary Session, the
Washington Legislature enacted legislation substantially amending
Washington's Workmen's Compensation Act.1 The major provisions
of the amendments provide for extension of mandatory coverage to
virtually all workers, substantial increases in benefits in most areas of
compensation, and an option allowing employers to self-insure under
limited and highly restricted conditions. 2 The Act was further
amended by the 1972 legislature. 3 The liberalization of coverage and
benefits generally met with the approval of both industry and labor,
4
but industry was disappointed with the failure of the legislature to
adopt the "three-way plan" proposed by Governor Evans. The
three-way plan would have afforded employers an additional option
of insuring with private insurance carriers.5
The scope of this note is confined to a discussion of the controver-
sial provisions extending coverage to all workers and the adoption of
1. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1961), as amended Ch. 289 [1971] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex.
Sess. [hereinafter referred to as Ch. 289].
2. See Burt, Every Worker to Get Industrial Insurance, Seattle Times, June 27,
1971, § A, at 17, col. 1. Approximately 600,000 workers not previously covered are cov-
ered by the new law, doubling the number of workers previously covered. Compensa-
tion payments for accidental injuries and death are to average approximately 80 per-
cent higher than under the previous law. As examples of benefit increases, awards for
permanent partial disabilities reflect a 20 percent increase: specific awards for amputa-
tion of a leg or an arm increased from $15,000 to $18,000; removal of one eye from
$6,000 to $7,200. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.080, as amended Ch. 289 § 10(1) at 1551.
Pensions for total disabilities were increased from $185 (for an unmarried employee) to
$352) (married, five or more children), to a range of 60 percent of the worker's wage,
not less than $185, up to 75 percent of a worker's wage (married, five or more children),
not less than $353 per month. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.060 as amended Ch. 289, § 8 at
1549, 1550.
Note: under Ch. 289, § 8(16), the monthly payment may not exceed 75 percent of the
statewide average monthly wage, currently about $621; thus the present ceiling for per-
manent disability pensions would be $465. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND INDUSTRIES. A COMPARISON OF THE WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW BEFORE AND
AFTER REVISION BY THE 1971 LEGISLATURE 2 (1971).
3. Ch. 43 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. [hereinafter referred to as Ch. 43].
4. Larson, Insurance Bill Flies Through, Seattle Times. May 16, 1971, § B. at 8, col.
1. There are some dissenting industry opinions, some businessmen believing that a lib-
eral law encourages malingering.
5. See Mertena, Evans and Labor Geared for tin Insurance Battle, Olympian (Olym-
pia), Jan. 20, 1971, at 6, col. 3.
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the two-way plan. These provisions have provoked much criticism of
the legislation and have resulted in test litigation. Extension of cov-
erage to all employments is necessary and was long overdue. It will be
shown that the adoption of the two-way insurance plan, allowing an
employer to self-insure his liability as an option to insuring with the
state insurance fund is preferable to a three-way plan allowing insur-
ance with private carriers. The two-way plan best achieves the pur-
pose of workmen's compensation: the provision of certain and ade-
quate compensation for employment-caused injuries6 at the least cost
to the employer.
I. BACKGROUND
Before the adoption of workmen's compensation statutes the in-
jured workmen, their families, or the state bore the great burden of
losses resulting from industrial accidents. The common law defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
doctrine absolved the employer of most liability for the injuries of
employees working in dangerous places.7 However, a belief that the
economic loss from industrial injuries should be born by the industries
as a cost of production8 soon led to legislative action.
Workmen's compensation statutes compromised the interests of
6. State ex rel, Fletcher v. Carrol, 94 Wash. 531, 535, 162 P. 593, 595 (1917) (noting
purpose of workmen's compensation laws).
7. For a general history of the development of the law of workmen's compensation
see WASH. REV. CODE § 51.01.010 (1961), stating a declaration of the policy of the
workmen's compensation act, and I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 4, 5
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. See also E. CHEIT & M. GORDON, OCCUPATIONAL
DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 17-19 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CHEIT & GORDON].
Under the common law damage recoveries were difficult and pathetically small when
successful. In New York City in 1908, for example, 74 cases of industrial death
were investigated. In 43 percent of these cases there was no recovery, in 41 percent
recovery was under $500, and in 16 percent recovery was between $500 and $5000. Id.
Cf. I LARSON, supra, § 4.30 at 27, which cites German figures for the year 1907,
chosen because they are unusually full and detailed, showing that 42.05 percent of the
causes of industrial accidents were due to inevitable accidents connected with the em-
ployment; 5.28 percent were due to negligence of a fellow servant; 16.81 percent were
due to negligence or fault of the employer; and the remaining due to an act of God or
some negligence on the part of the injured employee. Under the common law, with the
defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, workers had no remedy
in more than 83 percent of these cases, and the doctrine of assumption of risk would be
applied to bar recovery in many of the remaining cases caused by employer negligence.
8. The basic principle underlying workmen's compensation is the recognition that
accidents to workmen are inevitable, and, as a cost of production, should be passed on
to the consumer in the cost of the goods. In Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Comm'n, 91
Wash. 588, 590-91, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916) the Washington Supreme Court found that
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both employers and employees so both could gain. Workmen gave up
the right to sue their employers and the possibility of being awarded
unlimited damages to gain certain compensation protected from the
risks of litigation, years of delay, and the cost of employing counsel to
recover for injuries sustained.9 The employers gave up their common
law defenses, accepting limited liability for all injuries in employment.
Workmen's compensation does not place the entire cost of acci-
dents on industry.' 0 The function and purpose of workmen's compen-
sation is to compensate for economic loss, not for physical injuries as
such. Compensation for pain and suffering has never been awarded,
though this limitation has been compromised slightly in allowing
schedule benefits for certain disabilities, such as loss of body mem-
bers, without proof of wage loss."
Today there are fifty-four separate compensation statutes in the
United States12 with every state, the Distridt of Columbia and Puerto
Rico adopting its own system, plus two federal systems covering cer-
tain employees.' 3 Washington's compensation plan, prior to the 1971
"[a] 11 agreed that the blood of the workman was a cost of production, that the industry
should bear the charge." Just as industry distributes the burden of depreciation and de-
struction of necessary buildings and machinery to its customers, so should the consumer
bear part of the cost of repairing the human machines without which the industry cannot
exist, or make partial payment as compensation for economic loss through irreparable
injury or death. Cf. W. DITTMAR, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 7 (2d ed.
1959).
The Stertz court also cited heavy judgments against employers, wasteful and slow liti-
gation, and large remuneration to lawyers handling workmen's cases as the evils which
the legislature intended to eliminate. See also State ex rel. Fletcher v. Carrol, 94 Wash.
531, 162 P. 593 (1917). The Carrol court stated that a reason for the adoption of work-
men's compensation was that the desparate states of the parties in personal injury claims
-the injured worker facing the possibility of pauperism for himself and his dependents
and the employer risking large judgments against him---resulted, more than any other
type of litigation, in a high incidence of unfair means, false testimony, and perjury. The
Washington legislature codified this doctrine in Chapter 43.
9. Under the present appeals procedure, the workman who appeals an adverse de-
termination of his claim may still incur the risk of litigation, years of delay, and the cost
of employing counsel. But relatively few claims are appealed: in fiscal year 1971,
118,284 compensation claims were filed, of which the department ruled 5,085 invalid,
on whfich 2,847 appeals were filed. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRIES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SUMMARY THROUGH JUNE 30, 1971 4 (1971).
10. "The most liberal of our compensation laws allow the injured workman
two-thirds of his wage loss, and even those laws limit the period during which compensa-
tion is payable and prescribe a maximum wage for purposes of computing compensa-
tion." White, The Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 411,
412(1930).
11. See, e.g., Ch. 43, § 21.
12. CHEIT & GORDON, supra note 7, at 48, n.l.
13. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq. (1970); Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 90 1, et seq. (1970).
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amendment, was unique in its combination of mandatory insurance
exclusively through a state fund and its coverage of "extrahazardous"
employments only. This unusual plan can be traced to its early adop-
tion: Washington was the first state to adopt a comprehensive manda-
tory workmen's compensation plan in 1911.14 In adopting a manda-
tory plan, Washington ignored a New York decision holding a 1910
compulsory compensation law violative of due process requirements. 15
Other states adopted voluntary plans until the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of mandatory workmen's compen-
sation laws in 1917.16 The Court upheld Washington's exclusive state
fund system the same year in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington.17
Pre-1917 doubts of the constitutionality of a state-monopolized insur-
ance plan had caused other states to institute insurance coverage by
private carriers, in some instances in competition with a state fund, 18
and by 1917 the private insurance carriers were well established in
most states.
II. MANDATORY COVERAGE EXTENDED TO
ALL EMPLOYEES
Sixty years after adopting coverage for only specified extrahazard-
ous employments1 9 the legislature extended mandatory coverage to all
14. Washington and Kansas both adopted workmen's compensation laws on March
14, 1911. The Kansas act was a voluntary plan. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR WAGE AND
STANDARDS ADMIN., BULL. No. 16 1, STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS I (rev. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as BULL. No. 161].
15. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). Washington's
compulsory compensation plan was upheld against a claim of unconstitutionality in
Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 (1911).
16. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
17. 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
18. Only Washington and Ohio followed the model of the German compensation
laws of 1884 under which employers discharged their obligations by payments to a state
insurance fund responsible to workers for compensation payments. Other states fol-
lowed the English model of 1897 under which the employer, under a new statuatory
condition of liability, remained liable for compensation and he in turn could insure his
risk with private insurance carriers. Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensa-
tion as Social Insurance, A Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv.
57, 61. The Washington law "is not an employer's liability act. It is not even an ordinary
compensation act. It is an industrial insurance statute .... [T] he employee is no longer
to look to the master even for the scheduled and mandatory compensation. He must
look only to a fund fed by various employers." Stertz v. Industrial Insurance
Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 594-5, 158 P. 256, 259(1916).
19. Washington's "hazardous employments only" limitation on coverage, finally
abandoned by the 1972 amendments, resulted from the legislature's pre-1917 doubt as
720
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employments, 20 approximately doubling the number of workers cov-
ered by the plan.
The general inclusion of farm labor, domestic workers, and em-
ployees of charitable institutions places the Washington plan in the
vanguard of progressive compensation systems,21 but the legislature
deemed it best to exclude certain of these employees from mandatory
coverage. Section 7 of Chapter 43 enumerates the only employments
exempted from mandatory coverage: domestic servants where less
than two are employed in a private home; persons doing gardening,
maintenance or repair work of a short duration about a private home;
persons engaged in casual work which is not in the course of business
of the employers; persons performing services for religious or chari-
table organizations in return for aid and sustenance only; sole proprie-
tors and partners; and agricultural employees earning less than $150 a
year from the one employer. 22
to whether a statute not so restricted would be found a constitutionally proper exercise
of the police power of the state. That doubt was dispelled in New York Central R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The limitation of coverage to "hazardous" or "extra-
hazardous" employments has been severely criticized as defeating much of the purpose of
workmen's compensation since many workers are not covered under such classification
(approximately one-half of the Washington labor force was excluded before the 1971
amendment) and because hairsplitting distinctions do not contribute to "fast and sure"
compensation, causing an appalling waste of judicial time and effort, and a continuing
unpredictability of coverage. See IA LARSON, supra note 7, § 55.24. See also Malone,
Hazardous Business and Employments Under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Law, 22 TUL. L. REV. 412 (1948).
20. Ch. 289, § 3 extended coverage to virtually all employments by expediently
deeming all employments "extrahazardous." In Ch. 43, § 6, the legislature finally aban-
doned the "extrahazardous" classification, recognizing simply "[t] hat there is a hazard
in all employment and it is the purpose of this title to embrace all employments which
are within the legislative jurisdiction of the state." Ten states (Illinois, Kansas, Louis-
iana, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma and
Wyoming) still retain specified extrahazardous-employment-only coverage. BULL. No.
161, supra note 14, at 13.
21. For example, only eight other states and Puerto Rico do not categorically ex-
empt domestic workers from workmen's compensation coverage. Of these, all but
Puerto Rico, Alaska, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have broader exceptions than the
Washington rule exempting employers of "less than two employees regularly employed
forty or more hours a week." BULL. No. 161, supra note 14, at 16-17.
22. Additionally, employees within the state covered by federal compensation stat-
utes are not entitled to state coverage. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.12.090-.100 (1961) as
amended Ch. 43, §§ 10, 11, exempts maritime workers and employees of enterprises
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.
The exclusion of certain employments is not an unmixed boon to the employer.
as an injured worker can sue and recover substantial damages when he can prove
negligence on the part of the employer. When workmen's compensation does not
cover the employment the employer may be liable in a tort action for the full meas-
ure of damages suffered by his employees, See, e.g., Hopper v. Galland, 46 Wn.2d 552,
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The exemptions for domestic workers, persons performing service
for religious institutions and persons working about private homes are
not inconsistent with the basic workmen's compensation concept of
passing the cost of industrial injuries to consumers since there is no
large consumer public to whom the risk may be distributed. Farm
labor is categorically exempted from coverage in most states. 23 The
exclusion was originally founded on the theory that farming was a
way of life and not a hazardous employment 24 and has been main-
tained because of the remaining large number of small farms and the
casual nature of farm labor which presents administrative difficulties
in maintaining the necessary records.2 5 Modern trends in farming
have largely negated the reasons for the exclusion. The trends toward
larger farms, specialization of crops, and the mechanization of agri-
culture place the modern farmworker in much the same situation as
the industrial worker. The bookkeeping burdens placed on the em-
ployer are no more onerous than the burdens of income tax, F.I.C.A.
assessments, unemployment insurance and personal liability or volun-
tary workmen's insurance accounting already falling on farmers and
householder-employers. Some thirty states have excluded "casual"
employment from coverage 26 because of the difficulty of keeping rec-
ords of past earnings when employment is not regular and sustained.
Employment is generally considered "casual" when it is irregular,
282 P.2d 1049 (1955). In Hopper a farmworker was awarded $2000 general dam-
ages and $1734 special damages when he lost several fingers when his hand
slipped into a belt of a wheat combine, the court finding employer negligence in
failure to provide a safe place to work and in failure to properly warn and instruct the
plaintiff of the danger. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.110 (1917), the elective adop-
tion provision, any employer not within the mandatory coverage of the workmen's
compensation law may elect to so cover his employees upon application and notice.
Under this option, the farmer in Hooper would have been assessed a premium of only
$0.078 per man-hour worked for absolution from liability. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
SIA'IISIlcs. DEP"I OI- LABOR. BULL No. 206. AGRICULTURAl WORKERS AND COMPENSA-
lION 3, 9 n.7 (1959), [hereinafter cited as BULL. No. 206]. Cf. Ch. 219 [1949] Wash.
Laws, by which the injured employee would have received only $1,450 in compensa-
tion for the loss of all fingers on one hand.
23. In 1959 only California, Hawaii and Puerto Rico provided compulsory cov-
erage for farmworkers, with 35 compensation plans specifically exempting farmworkers
from coverage. BULL. No. 206, stupra note 22, at 5. In 1968, 21 states and Puerto Rico
gave some coverage by law to agricultural workers, but only 14 covered them in ap-
proximately the same way as other workers. BULL. No. 161, stupra note 14, Table 3 at
14.
24. BULL. No. 206, supra note 22, at 2. This theory reflects the strength of the farm
lobby and the commonly held notion of the "family farm."
25. See IA LARSON, supra note 7, § 53.20.
26. Id., § 51.11.
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unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature.27 Washington joins most
of these states in exempting casual labor only if the employment is not
in the usual course of business of the employer.28 Although exemp-
tions for farm and casual labor are rationalized on the grounds of
administrative impracticability, it should be noted that such exemp-
tions are actually politically expedient. Farm labor, for example, is no
more "sporadic" in nature than the construction and building trades
and other employments which are not exempted from coverage.
In removing the general exemption for charities and religious or-
ganizations, 29 the Washington legislature joined only California in
extending an exemption for those "employees" of charitable organiza-
tions being compensated solely with aid and sustenance.30 Charities
were exempted from coverage on the rationale that under the
common law they have no liability for negligence and they cannot
pass the cost of liability on to consumers. The common law doctrine
of tort immunity for charities has been abrogated in Washington, 31
based in part on the finding that charities can distribute risks to the
public benefitting from their services. The Washington exemption for
persons being compensated by aid and sustenance only is consistent
with the spirit of workmen's compensation and is a reasonable codifi-
cation of the principle of not covering "relief workers". 32 They are not
27. Id., § 51.00. The term "casual labor" is difficult to define. Larson defines it as
"the sort of thing no one could confidently rely on as a regular source of income. Id.
at 910, citing Cierpik v. Borough of Manasguan, 2 N.J. Super. 110, 64 A.2d 890 (1949).
Mere brevity of employment is not conclusive, if there is a reasonable probability of
regular recurrence or continuance for a substantial period. See IA LARSON, supra note
7, § 51.12.
It should be noted that the test applied is whether the employment is casual, not
whether the particular employee's relation to the employment is casual (is the particular
employment a casual incident of the employer's business?). If the work done is central
to the employer's business its brevity should not bring it within the "casual" exception.
Id.
28. Ch. 289, § 3(3), requires that, to be exempted, "the employment is not in the
course of the trade, business, or profession of [the] employer." If the employee is en-
gaged in a regular part of the employer's business he is covered, regardless of how brief
or sporadic his employment may be. See IA LARSON § 51.21. See also, e.g., Farnum v.
Linden Hills Congregational Church, 267 Minn. 84, 149 N.W.2d 689 (1967), where the
trimming of trees on church premises was held to be in the usual course of business of
the church.
29. Ch. 289, § 3(4).
30. 3 LARSON, supra note 7, Appendix A, Table 3, at 514, 515.
31. See Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, Inc., 65 Wn.2d 174, 396 P.2d 546 (1964)
(abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity in its entirety).
32. See Blake v. Department of Labor and Industries, 196 Wash. 681, 84 P.2d 365
(1938), which held that the distinction of"relief work" is generally based on whether the
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employees in the true sense; compensation is not paid under a con-
tract for hire, but rather relief is extended under a duty to care for the
poor. If the charity continues to grant care and sustenance to the in-
jured "employee" he has sustained no economic loss. 33
III. THE SELF-INSURANCE PROVISION
Sections 26 through 36 of the 1971 amendatory act 34 grant Wash-
ington employers a highly restricted and limited right to self-insure as
an alternative to the exclusive state fund.35 The same statutes, claims
procedures, and benefit schedules apply to the self-insurer as to state
fund employers, so the effect on the employee is negligible. Some
employers may find certain economic and personnel relations benefits
in administering their own programs, determining the merit of claims
(subject to the right of appeal), and absorbing the costs directly, rather
than paying premiums to the Department of Labor and Industries
which administers the state fund and issues checks in payment of
compensation. 36
claimant would continue to receive the same sustenance whether he worked or not, as
opposed to a person whose compensation is dependent on and in proportion to his labor.
33. Charitable institutions might prefer to limit their liability under workmen's
compensation rather than risk full tort liability which is possible when workmen's com-
pensation does not cover the employment. See note 22, supra.
34. Now codified as WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.14.010-.110 (1971).
35. All workmen's compensation systems but five (Nevada, North Dakota, Puerto
Rico, Texas, and Wyoming) permit employers to self-insure. Washington joins Ohio and
West Virginia in recognizing self-insurance as an alternative to their otherwise exclu-
sive state funds. 3 LARSON, supra note 7, § 92. 10, Table 7 at 522-3.
36. The exercise of the right of an employer to administer his own compensation
plan as a self-insurer can be of advantage or disadvantage. The self-insurance program
is generally beneficial to an employer who has losses below the average for his industry.
Prior to the 1971 amendments this advantage would have been minimized by Washing-
ton's "cost experience rating" system by which employers experiencing injury rates
higher or lower than the average for their class paid respectively higher or lower prem-
iums. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.16.020 (1961), repealed by Ch. 289, § 89. Self-
administration may produce further economies. However, the apparent economies of
self-administration are minimized by the necessity of the self-insurer maintaining
a staff within his organization in order to properly administer and manage the work-
men's compensation plan, while the state fund employer benefits from the state
administration of claims of his employees, with corresponding economies of scale.
Labor relations benefits can be gained or lost in the integration of the employer's
compensation policies with his labor relations and safety programs. While employee
good will can be gained by prompt and proper allowance and payment of compensa-
tion, establishing a reputation for fairness and concern, primary administration can be a
disadvantage in that the self-insurer will not be able to blame the "bureaucrat" for
claims which are filed and denied, and hence may incur employee antagonism. The state
fund was recognized as an advantage in this respect in 1911: "When the employer, for
724
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To safeguard the purposes of workmen's compensation the Act
requires such strict conditions for self-insuring as to render the option
of little advantage to most employers. 37 A prospective self-insurer must
satisfy the director that he is financially able to make prompt payment
according to the law,38 including long term compensation payment to
disabled workers or their widows and dependents. 39 The employer may
also be required to pay his share of any existing deficit within the
employer's class account which may have been incurred while the em-
ployer was within the state fund.40 Section 2841 requires the employer
to file (a) an itemized sworn statement indicating liquid assets
sufficient to meet estimated liabilities as a self-insurer; (b) evidence of
an effective safety organization within his establishment; and (c) a de-
scription of his administrative organization, including qualifications of
personnel, to be used in reporting injuries, authorizing medical care,
and handling claims and payment of compensation to the satisfaction
of the director.
Section 27(5)42 allows a self-insurer to reinsure up to eighty per-
his part, pays his share into this fund, all obligation on his part to anybody is ended. Let
a claim be rejected by the'commission, the latter and not the employer is sued." Stertz v.
Industrial Insurance Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 595, 158 P. 256, 259 (1916).
37. As of January 1, 1972, only 53 employers had been approved to self-insure.
Letter to the author from the Statistical Research Division, Industrial Insurance Divi-
sion, Washington State Dept. of Labor and Industries, Olympia. Compare OHIo REV.
CODE § 4123.35 (1965) which permits employers:
who will abide by the rules of the commission and who may be of sufficient finan-
cial ability to render certain the payment of compensation to injured employees or
the dependents of killed employees ... equal to or greater than is provided for in
[the provision for payment by the state fund] ... upon a finding of such facts by
the commission [to] elect to pay individually such compensation .... The commis-
sion may require such security or bond from said employers ... as it deems proper,
adequate, and sufficient to compel, or secure to such injured employees, or to the
dependents of such employees ... the payment of such compensati6n and expenses,
which shall in no event be less than that paid or furnished out of the state insurance
fund in similar cases to injured employees ... whose employers contribute to said
fund ....
38. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.15.020, .030 (1971) provides that a prospective self-
insurer may establish financial ability by a deposit of money or securities in an
escrow account in a depository designated by the director or by a security bond of
not less than $100,000; the director, in determining the amount of deposit or bond, is to
consider the financial ability of the employer, the amount of annual claims against him,
and his probable continuity of operations.
39. A recognized problem with self-insurance is the assurance of future solvency of
the employer in order that he can pay long-term compensation obligations despite disas-
trous accidents and business depressions. See 3 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 92.10.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.020 (1971) as amended Ch. 43, § 16(4).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.030 (1971).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.020(5) (1971).
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cent of his liability with an authorized private carrier. This section
also provides that such reinsurer may not in any way participate in the
administration of the responsibilities of the self-insurer, which pre-
vents opening a loophole that could result, in effect, in a "three-way
system" with the state fund indirectly competing with private carriers
in administrating workmen's compensation.
In adopting the "two-way plan" the legislature rejected a "three-way
plan" proposed by Governor Evans and strongly supported by the
business lobby.43 The proposed three-way plan would have granted
employers the option of insuring with private carriers in addition to
the present options of insuring with the state fund or self-insuring. 44
In theory, allowing private insurance as an alternative to the state
fund should have advantages for all. Business wanted the private in-
surance option because private insurers perform many services for the
employers which the state fund does not.45 Private insurance would
give relief to employers having accident rates below the industry aver-
age, and the competitive factor of low premiums would give em-
ployers incentive to reduce injuries and minimize their economic con-
sequences. Insurance administration could be integrated with the em-
ployers' personnel programs to minimize the alienation of employees
from impersonal relationships and, assuming that a state monopoly is
inefficient, competition would force the state fund to improve services
to employers, reduce premiums, and to expedite the disposition of
claims.
The labor lobby opposed the private insurance option principally
because private insurance costs more with no greater protection for
the workers. 46 In addition to paying federal, state, and local taxes,
43. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March 31, 1971, at 4, col. 7. See also Nelson,
Workmen's Compensation Bill-House Votes Yes; Senate...?, Olympian (Olympia).
March 31, 1971, at 8, col. 1.
44. Only four of the workmen's compensation statutes now require insurance in an
exclusive state fund (Nevada, North Dakota, Puerto Rico and Wyoming). Washington,
Ohio and West Virginia give employers an option to self-insure. All other plans permit
insurance with private carriers either exclusively or in competition with the state funds.
3 LARSON, supra note 7, Table 7 at 522. See also note 35, supra.
45. Private carriers provide inspection and safety services, publication and records
and assist the employer in administering his safety and compensation plans. State funds
have been criticized as not adequately providing such services. See CnEIT & GORDON.
supra note 7, at 99, 121. See also text accompanying note 48, infra.
46. See Clayman, In Defense of State Workmen's Compensation Funds, 31 ROCKY
Mli. L. Ri v. 428, 433 (1959) 1hereinafter cited as Clayman]. Administrative waste in
workmen's compensation is substantial. Thomas Dewey stated in 1953 that "less than 40
cents of every dollar paid by employers for workmen's compensation ever reaches the
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private carriers must allow for profit and contingencies and incur
acquisition costs (commissions, brokerage fees, and "sales" and collec-
tion expenses) not common to state funds enjoying a monopoly.47
Another disadvantage of offering a private insurance option and
another reason why labor vehemently opposed the plan, is that the
presence of an alternative would raise the cost of the state plan. The
cost of compensation insurance provided by a state monopoly is less
than similar insurance provided by private carriers or by competing
state funds.48 It is foreseen that once private insurance becomes estab-
lished in the state its lobby will press to make the state plan truly
compete with them for the same market and urge an end to the sub-
stantial tax exemptions enjoyed by the state fund.49 A state fund not
enjoying a complete monopoly would have to actively solicit accounts,
incurring substantial acquisition costs in employing "salesmen" to
seek out clients. Permitting private carriers to share the market would
reduce the economies of scale enjoyed by the state fund by reducing
the number of covered workers; would result in duplication of safety
investigation, accident prevention research programs and medical re-
insured workman and his dependents. The remaining 60 cents out of every dollar is
absorbed by charges of the insurance companies, administration, hospital charges, med-
ical costs, lawyer's fees and other costs. Thus the rights of labor to adequate benefits
under the law are adversely affected by the high cost of insurance." Cf. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Table 447 at 295 (1970) which states the total cost of workmen's compensa-
tion nationally in 1968 as 1.07 percent of the covered payroll, while benefits paid
averaged 0.63 percent of the covered payroll.
See also Olympian, Feb. 24, 1971, infra note 48, which paraphrases Joe Davis,
labor lobby president, as saying that "insurance firms would pay only about 60 per
cent of premiums back out in claims, whereas the present state system pays 102 per
cent (because of interest on investments [sic] ."
47. Commission and brokerage expenses are high-I 1 percent of the total pre-
miums for all stock companies writing workmen's compensation in 1960. CHEIT &
GORDON, supra note 7, at 109. Acquisition costs are reported to run to 172 percent of
premiums. Clayman, supra note 46, at 435.
48. St. Clair, The Case for Private Insurance of Workmen's Compensation, 31
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 397, 413 (1959) [hereinafter cited as St. Clair]. Labor objects to pri-
vate insurance carriers, as interested parties, having the power to allow or deny claims,
subject to review only on appeal by the workman, a party who may be reluctant because
of financial reasons or employer influence to pursue his claim.
Another ground for opposition is that benefits tend to be lower in states which permit
private insurance, possibly attributable to the strength of the insurance lobby in these
states, resisting higher benefits. See Olympian (Olympia), Feb. 24, 1971, at 4, col. 3.
49. The state plan pays no direct federal, state and local taxes. See St. Clair, supra
note 48, at 411. It is probable that state funds receive other substantial support from the
state in the form of office space in state buildings and ancillary services from other state
agencies.
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search; and would cause reductions in the state's research budget in
order to meet the competition of private carriers. 50
The cost of compensation is a legitimate concern of labor. Though
the cost of compensation is, in theory, passed on to the consumer, the
price of the goods produced must be competitive and the price reflects
other costs of labor such as wages, pensions and other fringe benefits.
Put simply, reduction of waste in the expenses of insuring and admin-
istering compensation 5 will result in savings which can be used to
increase compensation benefits, or, if premiums are reduced, the sav-
ings could be applied to higher wages or other compensation to labor.
The state insurance monopoly has been criticized as infringing on
free enterprise. 52 While there are valid reasons for advocating private
insurance, the opponents of the state fund seem to be principally the
private insurance carriers and their agents, asserting their right to
compete for a commission. The private enterprise argument has been
given no credence in any other types of social insurance in America
such as old age and survivors' insurance and unemployment compen-
sation.53 Germany's pioneering compensation law of 1884 established
the principle of state-administered social insurance and Washington
adopted that principle in 1911. "It is now commonly conceded that
50. The activities of private carriers in preventing injuries and minimizing their
consequences is an oft-cited justification for private insurance carriers. Private insur-
ance safety work includes inspection and consultative service for employers and re-
search into accident causes, work procedures, and occupational disease hazards. Some
of the larger carriers maintain their own research laboratories; others use the facilities of
an insurance association or of private research organizations. See CHEIT & GORDON,
.mnpra note 7, at 99; .see also St. Clair, .ipra note 48, at 407-08. The expenditures of the
Washington Industrial Insurance Commission for safety work averages 2 percent of
compensation premiums collected annually, approximately equal to the percentage of
premiums spent by private carriers. Id. at 408-09.
51. See Nelson, Workmen's Compensation Bill--House Votes Yes; Senate...?,
Olympian (Olympia), March 31, 1971, at 8, col. 1, reporting that the bill proposed by
labor (which would retain the state monopoly) would pump $85 million annually into
the accident fund at a cost to employers of $109 million, while the three-way plan pro-
posed by industry would put $56.2 million into the fund at an estimated cost to em-
ployers of $108.2 million.
The administrative cost of the fund will probably increase as a percentage of prem-
iums due to the extension of coverage. Employments which are now covered and which
were not formerly considered to be extrahazardous should have far lower claims per
man-hour. Administration costs in collecting the lower premiums from these employers
will be a higher percentage of the premiums than would be the collection costs of the
higher premium rates.
52. See Seattle Times, J an. 4, 1971, § B, at 2, col. I. I n an oral opinion Judge Baker.
criticizing the 1971 amendments (though not finding them unconstitutional), said: "I
personally feel this is another nail in the coffin of free enterprise, which we do not need."
53. See Clayman, supra note 46, at 430-33, attacking the free enterprise argument.
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the ideal of protecting the public interest and the security of the indi-
vidual supersedes the principle of free enterprise. '54 Private insurance
plans were initiated in other states as a result of an erroneous interpre-
tation of the Constitution. 55 After sixty years, criticism of the Wash-
ington plan on this basis seems misplaced.
CONCLUSION
The 1971 amendments to the workmen's compensation act were
long overdue. The extension of coverage to all employments, in-
cluding farmworkers, must be regarded as the most important provi-
sion. The general increase of benefits was the first since 1965 and was
necessary to bring the plan into line with increases in the cost of living
and wages generally, more equitably compensating injured workmen
for their economic losses.
But the recent amendments have left work undone. The primary
purpose of workmen's compensation is to provide the workman with a
certain, prompt and adequate remedy. The remedy in Washington has
not in all cases been prompt. The average length of time for an ap-
pealed claim to be processed to completion has been sixty-nine weeks.5 6
The lack of a speedy adjudication of claims does more than place eco-
nomic hardship on the disabled workman and his dependents, for in
many cases the denial of funds results in improper medical care, de-
feating the objective of workmen's compensation of restoring the em-
ployee to a normal, useful life. Under the present appeals procedure,57
largely unchanged by the 1971 amendments,58 there can be appeals
from three levels of factual determination. Questions of fact are deter-
mined by the supervisor of industrial insurance, from whom the order
can be appealed to either the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals5"
or to the hearing examiner for the Board, at the option of the appel-
54. Id. at 431.
55. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text, supra.
56. Seattle Times, Dec. 22, 1969, § D, at 4, col. 1. The Board of Industrial Insur-
ance Appeals has recently undertaken some moves to speed up the process to reduce the
average time from two years to 69 weeks. See Seattle Times, Dec. 21, 1969. § A. at 20,
col. 1, finding instances of delays of over 4 years in receiving compensation.
57. WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 51.52 (1961).
58. See Ch. 289, §§ 68-71.
59. For a description and analysis of the work of the Board see Rutledge, A New
Tribunal ofthe State of Washington, 26 WAsH. L. REV. 196 (1951).
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lant,60 and finally to a court of general jurisdiction for a jury trial de
novo,61 from which questions of law can be appealed. Counsel for the
workmen accrue fees at each separate step, the result further defeating
the purpose of the compensation law. 62
A solution to the problems of the appeals procedure is not obvious.
The procedure could be abbreviated by eliminating one level of deter-
mination of fact, either the Board or hearing examiner or the court of
general jurisdiction. Because of the expertise of the Board and the
examiner in the subject area and the fact that they hear witnesses and
therefore have an opportunity to weigh their credibility, 63 it would be
desirable to limit appeals from the Board to questions of law without
a jury trial. But there are historical and political obstacles to removing
juries from the appellate structure;64 the legislature and labor favor
the right to a jury trial.
It is not necessary to have de novo determinations of fact at the two
levels, particularly since the jury deciding on record has the effect of
overruling any determination in the procedure below. It would seem
expedient and more equitable to allow the appellant to select his pro-
cedure, to appeal to the Board with its determination of fact not sub-
ject to review, or to appeal directly to a jury trial in a superior court
60. Both the claimant (a workman or his beneficiary) and the employer have
standing to appeal. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.050 (1961).
61. The superior court's inquiry is limited to questions actually decided by the
Board. See Luntz v. Department of Labor and Industries, 50 Wn.2d 273, 310 P.2d 880
(1957).
62. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 8, 1966, at 29, col. I, citing a case in which a
claimant was awarded compensation for his losses in the amount of S5308. from which
had to be deducted $4000 in attorney's fees and $435 for medical witnesses.
63. See Wollett, The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals After Nine Years: A
Partial Evaluation, 33 WASH. L. REV. 80, 85 (1958). A jury in superior court hears no
witnesses, as the evidence before it consists entirely of the record before the Board.
WASH. REV. CODE § 5 1.52.115 (1961). The hearing in the superior court is to be de novo.
but the court is to admit no evidence other than that included in the record of the
hearing before the Board. The record is read to the jury, giving the jury little oppor-
tunity to draw secondary inferences such as the meaning of testimony, the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight to give evidence. See Wollett, supra, at 85, 87. See also
Alfredson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 5 Wn.2d 648, 651, 102 P.2d 37.
38-39 (1940), the first case construing this amendment, in which the court commented:
The provisions of the statute are somewhat unique, in that the verdict of the jury is
made final upon evidence produced from typewritten or printed pages, and not
from the mouths of witnesses present at a trial wherein they may be seen and heard
and their demeanor considered by the jury. Much value is always attached to the
verdict of the jury because of the fact that the witnesses are seen and heard during
the trial, where the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the various wit-
nesses may be considered ....
64. See Wollett, supra note 63, at 80.
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from the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance. Neither claimant nor
employer would suffer loss of due process, and the efficiency of the
appeals procedure would be greatly advanced. An "either/or" proce-
dure would reduce the case load of both the Board and the superior
courts.
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